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Abstract
Most previous works usually explained adversarial
examples from several specific perspectives, lack-
ing relatively integral comprehension about this
problem. In this paper, we present a systematic
study on adversarial examples from three aspects:
the amount of training data, task-dependent and
model-specific factors. Particularly, we show that
adversarial generalization (i.e. test accuracy on ad-
versarial examples) for standard training requires
more data than standard generalization (i.e. test ac-
curacy on clean examples); and uncover the global
relationship between generalization and robustness
with respect to the data size especially when data
is augmented by generative models. This reveals
the trade-off correlation between standard gener-
alization and robustness in limited training data
regime and their consistency when data size is
large enough. Furthermore, we explore how differ-
ent task-dependent and model-specific factors in-
fluence the vulnerability of deep neural networks
by extensive empirical analysis. Relevant recom-
mendations on defense against adversarial attacks
are provided as well. Our results outline a potential
path towards the luminous and systematic under-
standing of adversarial examples.
1 Introduction
Although deep learning has achieved impressive perfor-
mance in a wide range of machine learning tasks, recent re-
search [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014] has
discovered that existing deep neural networks are susceptible
to imperceptible perturbations of the input data, making erro-
neous but high-confident predictions. Furthermore, this phe-
nomenon under the name of adversarial examples is demon-
strated ubiquitous in machine learning systems, causing great
real-world security concerns.
There has been a flurry of recent papers proposing adver-
sarial attacks [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Kurakin et al.,
2016; Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2017; Athalye
∗Corresponding author.
et al., 2018] and defenses [Buckman et al., 2018; Trame`r et
al., 2017; Samangouei et al., 2018; Madry et al., 2017; Paper-
not et al., 2016; Liao et al., 2017] about this issue. Therefore,
intelligent attacks against intelligent defenses become an arm
race [Wang et al., 2018]. Apart from these, many hypothe-
ses have been suggested in the literature, trying to explain
the existence of adversarial examples from different perspec-
tives. Linearity hypothesis [Goodfellow et al., 2014] was
firstly proposed to explain this problem and obtained great
acceptance. Later work [Tanay and Griffin, 2016] studied the
linearity hypothesis further and argued that adversarial exam-
ples exist when the classification boundaries lie close to the
manifold of sampled data. Su et al. [2018] empirically found
out the trade-off of accuracy and robustness and revealed that
the robustness may be the cost of accuracy.
All the aforementioned explanations are mostly proposed
from specific perspectives to explain adversarial examples
and there is hardly any work that can provide us a system-
atic understanding towards this phenomenon. In addition,
Schmidt et al. [2018] stated that adversarial robust general-
ization for adversarial training requires more data and the
data set may not be large enough for adversarial training to
obtain a high robust generalization. A natural question could
be raised: Does robust generalization for standard training
also require more data? If so, there seems to exist some con-
tradictions since other works [Dimitris Tsipras, 2018; Su et
al., 2018] proposed that the robustness may be odds with ac-
curacy. It is well-known that more data can improve the gen-
eralization, another natural question needs to be answered:
will robustness be improved or worsen as the data size in-
creases, especially when data is large enough?
Considering the issues above, we conduct an empirical ex-
ploration towards the comprehensive understanding of adver-
sarial examples from three aspects: analyzing the generaliza-
tion and robustness from limited data to the “infinite”, task-
dependent and model-specific factors, attempting to unify
previous research and provide new insights in our explana-
tory framework. In particular, aiming at answering the afore-
mentioned questions between robustness and generalization
with regards to the data size, we investigate the variation of
robustness for standard training by changing the size of train-
ing data, especially achieving the data augmentation based on
Auxiliary Classifier GAN (ACGAN) [Odena et al., 2016]. It
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turns out that with the increase of training data, there indeed
exists a trade-off relationship that the robustness deteriorates
as the generalization performance increases when the train-
ing data are limited, however, the robustness starts to improve
when the size of data is large enough and finally robust gen-
eralization tends to converge to standard generalization, as
shown in Figure 2. This experimental result demonstrates that
in limited data regime, adversarially robust generalization for
standard training also requires more data. This finding for
standard training align with the observation in the adversarial
training scenario shown by Dimitris Tsipras [2018]; Su et al.
[2018]. However, we further show that the trade-off relation-
ship between generalization and robustness only exists in the
restricted training data. When the size of training data is large
enough, the trade-off disappears and the classifier can achieve
both good generalization and robustness. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to reveal the full spectrum of rela-
tionship between generalization, robustness and data size for
standard training.
As for the task-dependent factors, we investigate the corre-
lation between the input dimension, number of categories to
classify and the robustness, respectively. An interesting find-
ing of our analysis is that the robustness firstly increases and
then decreases as the input dimension expands, while it shows
an apparent downtrend as the number of categories increases.
This discloses the correlation between the complexity of de-
cision boundaries and the vulnerability. For model-specific
factors, we validate that the current convolutional neural net-
works actually have better robustness in comparison with
other machine learning methods and expanding network ca-
pacity in essence cannot provide real robustness though it can
contribute to defense against gradient-based attacks and mit-
igate transferability. In summary, the contributions of the pa-
per are listed below:
• We provide a systematic analysis on adversarial exam-
ples for standard training and unify relevant previous
works [Dimitris Tsipras, 2018; Su et al., 2018; Schmidt
et al., 2018], paving a way towards better understanding
about adversarial examples.
• We present the global relationship between standard
generalization and robust generalization for standard
training, showing the trade-off relationship in limited
data and consistency when data size is large enough.
• We validate the influence of task-dependent factors. In-
creasing the complexity of decision boundaries via in-
creasing input dimensions and number of categories, can
make classifier more susceptible to adversarial attacks.
• We demonstrate that the current convolutional neural
networks have better robustness than traditional ML ap-
proaches and reveal that increasing model capacity actu-
ally cannot bring real robustness albeit its better robust-
ness against limited attacks and mitigation of transfer-
ability.
2 A Closer Look at Adversarial Examples
The existence of adversarial examples in various machine
learning systems demonstrates that the robustness problem is
oracle decision boundary on population
decision boundary on samples
region of adversarial examples
Figure 1: Location of adversarial examples in the proximity of an
input example.
an inherent property of the statistical setup. Here we refine
the understanding on adversarial examples. We briefly recap
the definition of adversarial examples: crafted indistinguish-
able examples by adding maliciously constructed perturba-
tions on input data, causing the classifier to produce misclas-
sified predictions.
Define a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and the probability
measure P is called the population. The data set D is viewed
as a realization of a random element of this probability space.
Due to the imperceptibility in human vision, we assume that
both adversarial examples and legitimate examples are sam-
pled from the identical population P behind albeit the low
probability of occurrence for adversarial examples Nguyen
et al. [2015]; Yarin Gal [2018]. Due to the randomness of
D, the discrepancy between the decision boundary of classi-
fier trained on limited samples and the oracle one based on
all population data enables some legitimate data including
crafted adversarial examples, misclassified by current imper-
fect classifier.
More specifically, consider all adversarial examples with
restricted perturbations around a correctly-classified example
shown in Figure 1. Due to the discrepancy between the two
decision boundaries based on training samples and popula-
tion, there exists some legitimate examples of a given class
in the vicinity of an original example misclassified by exist-
ing classifier though they visually should belong to the pop-
ulation data from that class. Based on this comprehension,
we argue that it is the shortage of effective training data that
prevents the classifier from including all adjacent examples,
particularly those in the blue region in Figure 1, resulting in
the existence of adversarial examples.
It underlies the core question: will the robustness be en-
hanced if we offer sufficient training data to the classifier? It
is our natural expectation that when the size of data is large
enough, it would be sufficient to learn robust models. In other
words, the generalization and robustness are expected to be
consistent with respect to the amount of data. In addition, it
is also capable of resolving the inconsistency of relationship
between generalization and robustness proposed in the intro-
duction part by validating this hypothesis.
Besides that, what task and model factors affect the robust-
ness? Is there any effect of the complexity of decision bound-
aries on the vulnerability of deep neural networks? Are deep
neural networks themselves more susceptible to adversarial
attacks compared with other machine learning approaches?
All of these issues are what we pursue to explore in the fol-
lowing sections. In summary, we investigate these problems
through three experimental parts in this work.
Data size analysis. Try to uncover the global relationship
between standard generalization and robust generalization for
standard training with respect to the data size.
Task-dependent factors analysis. Attempt to explore the
influence of input dimension and number of categories on the
robustness of classifier.
Model-specific factors analysis. Compare with traditional
ML methods to inspect the vulnerability of convolutional
neural networks and then investigate the effect of network ca-
pacity [Madry et al., 2017] on the robustness.
3 Experimental Settings
We demonstrate our explanatory framework by performing
experiments on several commonly used datasets: MNIST,
SVHN, CIFAR10. Fashion-MNIST is an alternative in the
first part due to the limited generalization of ACGAN [Odena
et al., 2016] on SVHN. The experimental setup is as follows.
Adversarial attacks. To provide a thorough evaluation of
the robustness, various well-known attacks are considered:
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [Goodfellow et al.,
2014], PGD attack [Madry et al., 2017], Randomized Fast
Gradient Sign Method (RAND+FGSM) [Trame`r et al., 2017]
and Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack [Carlini and Wagner, 2017]
with l2-norm.
Model architectures. For the classifier on MNIST and
Fashion MNIST, we adopt the simple architecture with two
convolutional layers and three fully-connected layer and for
SVHN and CIFAR-10, we consider the standard ResNet18
model. All of our models are trained with identical setting of
optimizer for fair comparison and could achieve the state-of-
the-art test accuracy on clean data for corresponding datasets.
Evaluation of robustness. We consider the original images
that are correctly classified to eliminate the influence of stan-
dard generalization. Then we evaluate the classification accu-
racy on the adversarial examples for these correctly classified
images and denote it as Success Defense Rate.
4 Data Size Analysis
In this section, we will show that in the regime of limited
data and data augmentation case, the generalization and ro-
bustness of the classifier in the standard training behave dif-
ferently. In the scenario of limited training data, the general-
ization and robustness exhibit a trade-off relationship, while
in the setting of nearly infinite data, the robustness tends to
be consistent with generalization.
More specifically, we follow the definition of standard gen-
eralization and robust generalization from [Schmidt et al.,
2018]. In general, standard generalization measures the gen-
eralization over the clean test data while robust generalization
evaluates the generalization in the adversarial setting where
the classification should consider all examples in a pertur-
bation set of original examples. Here we aim to investigate
Data Sizepopulation
standard generalization 
robust generalization
Figure 2: Relationship between standard generalization and robust
generalization with respect to the amount of data.
whether adversarially robust generalizaton for standard train-
ing also requires more data than standard generalization. If
yes, we also need to explore the contradiction behind with
the proposals [Su et al., 2018; Dimitris Tsipras, 2018] that
robustness may be at odds with generalization. We demon-
strate the hypothesis above and resolve the contradiction by
exploring the global relationship between robust generaliza-
tion and standard generalization, especially through data aug-
mentation. We sketch this global relationship in Figure 2.
To verify the relationship between the standard generaliza-
tion and robust generalization shown in Figure 2, we investi-
gate the change of generalization and robustness with respect
to the size of training data by varying the number of training
samples from relatively small to large enough. Generalization
is measured by the accuracy on the test set and the robustness
is evaluated by Success Defense Rate. When the data size is
not larger than the existing dataset, we partition its training
set with n sub-datasets with a strict inclusion relationship:
A1 ⊂ A2 ⊂ ... ⊂ An and then we train models on each
sub-dataset, respectively. When the data size expands fur-
ther, we utilize the ACGAN [Odena et al., 2016], a version
of conditional GAN [Mirza and Osindero, 2014], to model
the conditional distribution of data first and then to generate
new images to augment the training set. Due to the limitation
on precision of ACGAN, we inject clean examples during the
training iterations to maintain the accuracy of original clas-
sifier. We conduct experiments on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST
and CIFAR10 and the results can be observed in Figure 3.
There is a consistent manifestation from Figure 3 that the
robustness evaluated on Success Defense Rate decreases first
and then increases later as the training data expands across the
three datasets. Nevertheless, the turning point of robustness
differs when the dataset changes, which is observed earliest
for MNIST, then for Fashion-MNIST and last for CIFAR10,
just in the ascending order of complexity of datasets. In addi-
tion, the result suggests that Success Defense Rate under CW
attack turns up later than the other attacks, indicating that CW
is a much stronger attack so that it requires more data to de-
fense against it, which coordinates with recent experimental
conclusions [Carlini and Wagner, 2017]. As the size of data
is enlarged, Success Defense Rate quickly increases to a high
level and then saturates. Although there is a slight decline in
the phase of data augmentation due to the limited precision
of ACGAN, the apparent uptrend can still be easily observed,
providing a strong evidence to our previous statement.
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Figure 3: Relationship between generalization and robustness with respect to the data size under different adversarial attacks on MNIST,
Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR10. Black dashed line represents the test accuracy and decimals behind FGSM denote the perturbation .
Through the data size analysis via data augmentation based
on generative models, we have revealed a global relationship
between standard generalization and robust generalization for
standard training. The experimental result extends and unifies
the viewpoints proposed in [Su et al., 2018; Schmidt et al.,
2018; Dimitris Tsipras, 2018]:
On one hand, it indeed shows a trade-off relationship be-
tween the generalization and robustness for standard training
before the turning point occurs. As for the underlying reason,
we conjecture that with a limited number of samples, training
on these data helps the classifier to find a better and clearer
decision boundary, resulting in high robustness in the initial
stage, just as proposed in [Anonymous, 2019b]. As the data
size increases, the decision boundary tends to be more com-
plicated and delicate while more training data may lead to
higher accuracy, which yields adversarial examples to forge
easily. In this case, the generalization and robustness for stan-
dard training gradually develop a trade-off relationship.
On the other hand, when the training data is large enough
with respect to the complexity of classifier, Success Defense
Rate ascends to close 100% where no adversarial attacks can
be successfully crafted, implying that the robustness general-
ization converges to the standard generalization for standard
training. To further explore the reason of the change of ro-
bustness, we calculate the magnitude of gradients with re-
spect to the input images under L1, L2 and L∞ norms; and
plot the relationship between median of those gradients and
the data size, shown in Figure 4. An interesting observation
is that the magnitude of gradients gradually vanishes with the
increase of the data size. To further probe the cause of gra-
dients vanishing, we exhibit the change of median of confi-
dence measured by maximum softmax probability of network
outputs and demonstrate that it is the saturation of predic-
tion probability that yields the vanishing of gradients. More
specifically, as the size of data increases, the classifier is ca-
pable of including more examples in input space, especially
those in the blue region in Figure 1. In this case, the gap
between decision boundary on samples and the oracle one is
narrowed, thus improving the robustness as claimed in Ses-
sion 2. We argue that this type of gradient vanishing is not the
phenomenon of obfuscated gradients proposed in [Athalye et
al., 2018] since our method is not involved in any complex
defensive mechanism, on the contrary, it is actually the pre-
sentation of real robustness when data size is large enough.
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Figure 4: Relationship between median of gradients (the first row),
confidence (the second row) and the data size on MNIST, Fashion-
MNIST and CIFAR10. Median gradients instead of average ones
are adopted to avoid the influence of extreme values.
Recommendation on defense In consideration of the
global relationship between robustness and generalization,
we speculate there might exist a kind of phenomenon called
robustness trap, in which the robustness is likely to continue
to deteriorate when we augment training data from the ex-
isting dataset although the generalization might be improved
during this process. Only if the augmented data is large
enough can the classifier overcome this trap and its robust-
ness is likely to turn better, which suggests us establish a more
precise generative model to overcome the phenomenon in the
future.
5 Task-Dependent Factors
For the classification task-dependent factors, we demonstrate
that it is the complexity of decision boundaries that aggra-
vates the problem of adversarial examples. Here we explore
the task-dependent factors from two explicit aspects: input
dimension and number of categories to classify.
5.1 Input Dimension
For the factor of input dimension, in general we propose that
classification tasks with more input dimensions are more vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks. We verify this proposal in the
following.
Previous work [Anonymous, 2019a] states that in the space
of high dimensional data, correctly classified data are very
close to misclassified examples, especially for adversarial
examples. It adheres to our intuition that the distance be-
tween examples is becoming subtler in the high dimensional
space, thus aggravating the vulnerability of classifier. Simon-
Gabriel et al. [2018] has proved this influence of input dimen-
sion on robustness in the adversarial regularization scenario.
In contrast, we conduct our exploration in a more general ex-
planatory framework, getting rid of the gradient-based reg-
ularization [Simon-Gabriel et al., 2018] and perform exper-
iments on more datasets with various types of attacks. The
observation from our experiments discloses some distinctions
with previous work [Simon-Gabriel et al., 2018], showing
that the integral correlation between the input dimension and
robustness is not just a simple monotonous one.
We implement the experiments by resizing the input im-
ages based on bilinear interpolation into different sizes. For
the convenience of design and the adaptation of datasets, we
apply different networks with similar architecture on three
datasets. For MNIST, we adopt a simple network with
one convolutional layer and two fully-connected layers. For
SVHN and CIFAR10, we apply networks with three convo-
lutional layers and three fully-connected layers, seven convo-
lutional layers and three fully-connected layers, respectively.
The experimental results are shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Relationship between the robustness and the input size on
MNIST, SVHN and CIFAR10. The input dimension is proportional
to the square of input size.
In general, the robustness presents a decreasing tendency
as the input dimension expands. However, it can be easily ob-
served that except CW attack, the robustness becomes worse
when the input dimension is too small. We hypothesize that it
is the small input dimensions that makes the classifier under
standard training suffer from overfitting, which can be veri-
fied by the decline of generalization as well.
5.2 Number of Categories to Classify
For the factor of number of categories to classify, it is intuitive
for us to expect that as the the number of categories grows,
the decision boundary will become more complicated, caus-
ing the classifier more susceptible to attacks. Thus, we select
training data with label from 0 to n and construct several sub-
sets with a strict inclusion relationship by enlarging n. Then
the networks with different categories to classify are trained
on these datasets and evaluated on corresponding robustness
under various attacks.
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Figure 6: Relationship between robustness and number of categories
to classify on MNIST, SVHN and CIFAR10.
As illustrated in Figure 6, there is an apparent downtrend of
robustness with the increasing of categories to classify though
we have to admit that some stochastic effects still exist. For
the three datasets, deep neural networks that are required to
classify more categories under standard training are more vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks, which is consistent with our in-
tuition from the perspective of complexity of decision bound-
aries mentioned before.
Recommendation on defense It is discouraging to admit
the fact that deep neural networks in those classification tasks
with higher input dimensions and more categories to classify
are liable to suffer from adversarial attacks since in practice
this is the trend to utilize deep neural networks to tackle more
complicated tasks in the future. Nevertheless, we might con-
sider to combine the models dealing with relative simple tasks
to resolve the complex task, probably maintaining a high ro-
bustness. In addition, resizing the image to a proper size is
beneficial to robustness as well.
6 Model-Specific Factors
For the model-specific factors, on the one hand, we reveal that
the robustness of deep neural networks is better than other
machine learning models for standard training. On the other
hand, we demonstrate that increasing model capacity can help
to defend against gradient-based attacks but it actually cannot
yield real robustness since they are still fragile faced with al-
ternative optimization-based CW attacks.
6.1 Comparison with Other Machine Learning
Approaches
We conduct experiments by comparing the robustness among
CNN, LinearSVM and Logistic regression on the three
datasets. The CNN has two convolutional layers and two
fully-connected layers. Logistic regression adopts standard
cross entropy loss and LinearSVM employs a variation of
multiclass hinge loss.
It might be the preconceived notion that deep neural net-
works are more susceptible to adversarial examples than other
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Figure 7: Comparison of robustness among CNN, Logistic regres-
sion and LinearSVM on MNIST, SVHN and CIFAR10.
traditional machines learning models due to their uncontrol-
lable Lipschitz constants [Zantedeschi et al., 2017]. However,
our experimental results present evidence that Success De-
fense Rates of CNN under each attack are consistently supe-
rior to the others, suggesting that the robustness of deep neu-
ral networks is much better than other typical machines learn-
ing systems, as shown in Figure 7. One thing should be men-
tioned that although the evaluation of robustness is based on
Success Defense Rate, which only examine on truly classified
examples by given classifier, this index is actually inevitably
influenced by generalization in this comparison because Lin-
earSVM and Logistic regression cannot attain the similar gen-
eralization performance as CNN especially on SVHN and CI-
FAR10. We can approximately conclude that CNN has both
better generalization and robustness that other machine learn-
ing approaches.
6.2 Model Capacity
Madry et al. [2017] demonstrated that larger model capac-
ity can decrease transferability of adversarial examples, how-
ever, we find out increasing model capacity actually cannot
bring real robustness by additionally testing CW attack.
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Figure 8: Relationship between the robustness and model capacity.
X axis is in log transformation.
We follow the definition of model capacity in [Madry et al.,
2017], namely the number of filters, and adopt the network
architecture with four convolutional layers and three fully-
connected layers for the convenience of implementation. To
increase the network capacity, we modified the network by
incorporating wider layers with different factors n, resulting
in the enlargement of number of filters with certain magnifi-
cation. Figure 8 depicts the trend of robustness with respect
to the number of filters. We can observe that Success Defense
Rate exhibits an apparent uptrend against gradient-based at-
tacks, i.e. FGSM and PGD attack. Madry et al. [2017] stated
that increasing the network capacity improves the resistance
against transfer attacks, which is in accordance with our result
since gradient-based attacks are more transferable that CW
attack, as proposed by [Su et al., 2018]. Furthermore, we
obtain a more profound conclusion that increasing network
capacity actually is unable to improve the real robustness of
deep neural networks since the networks are more vulnera-
ble against alternative optimization-based CW attacks [Car-
lini and Wagner, 2017]. This also raises an open problem that
what are the difference between CW attacks and others.
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Figure 9: Relationship between model capacity and median of mag-
nitude of gradients with L1, L2, L∞ norms.
Furthermore, we explore the correlation between the mag-
nitude of gradients and model capacity by calculating the me-
dian of gradients with different norms. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 9, for all the datasets, it displays an apparent downtrend as
the model capacity increases. This implies that the networks
with larger capacity have smaller gradients so that they have
better robustness against gradient-based attack. However, the
reduction of gradients have no improvement on CW attacks
that are not directly constructed based on gradients of orig-
inal loss. More differences between gradient-based attacks
and CW attacks are well worth exploring in the future.
Recommendation on defense Model capacity plays an im-
portant role on the robustness but it cannot bring real robust-
ness. Since network architecture is a more crucial factor for
robustness, it is a promising direction to design the robust
network architectures in the future.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we empirically present a systematical study on
adversarial examples from three aspects: the amount of data,
task-dependent factors and model-specific factors. In partic-
ular, we demonstrate that adversarially robust generalization
of deep neural networks under standard training also requires
more data, and reveal the global relationship between gen-
eralization and robustness especially through data augmen-
tation. Then we demonstrate that increasing complexity of
decision boundaries will aggravate the vulnerability of deep
neural networks from task-dependent factors and demystify
the relationship between model-specific factors and robust-
ness. Our analysis sheds light on the systematic understand-
ing of adversarial examples.
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